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Caps on Capsules: Prescription for Lower Drug 
Prices in the United States 
CHRISTINE CHASSE* 
ABSTRACT 
The United States is the foremost innovator of pharmaceutical therapies in the 
world. That innovation, however, comes at a price—literally. Americans pay more for 
their medications than any other country. In a country without universal healthcare, 
the topics of economics, human rights, and healthcare intersect at the crossroads of 
pharmaceutical pricing. In contrast to most other countries, the United States has no 
regulations on pharmaceutical price control. One major argument against government 
regulation is its inherent opposition to the free market system: the heart of the 
American economy. Further still is the argument that profit restriction would create a 
chilling effect on the industry, stifling the pharmaceutical industry’s cutting-edge (but 
expensive) innovations and jeopardizing the United States’ leading position in the 
global pharmaceutical industry. The most basic argument for profit control is to 
prevent pharmaceutical price monopolization so Americans can afford the care 
prescribed to them. This Comment summarizes some of the unique issues in the 
pharmaceutical industry, major arguments for and against profit control, and the 
current climate in United States’ politics and laws regarding this issue for a possible 
solution. Proposed solutions herein include policy changes to enhance Medicare’s 
ability to negotiate drug prices with manufacturers, limiting drug companies’ ability 
to raise prices without confines or explanation, and making reimbursement contingent 
on drug performance to ensure that new medications provide measurable benefits. This 
multipronged approach would not only make medications more affordable, but it 
would also increase the quality of new formularies. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States is arguably the world leader in both pharmaceutical development 
and innovation.1 For example, the United States is credited with 43.7% of all new 
molecular entities (NMEs) developed between 1992 and 2004 out of all other inventor 
countries.2 The United States also tops the list for having the world’s highest drug 
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1 See ROSS C. DEVOL, ARMEN BEDROUSSIAN & BENJAMIN YEO, MILKEN INST., THE GLOBAL 
BIOMEDICAL INDUSTRY, 6 (2011). 
2 Salomeh Keyhani, Steven Wang, Paul Hebert, Daniel Carpenter & Gerard Anderson, US 
Pharmaceutical Innovation in an International Context, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1075, 1075 (2010). 
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prices. On average, medications sold in the United States cost fifty percent more than 
in other developed countries.3 Are these two concepts in tandem? Economists estimate 
that if the United States had adopted European-style price controls on medications 
during the 1990s–early 2000s, it would have produced 117 fewer NMEs.4 The nation’s 
success in the pharmaceutical industry is attributed to an array of influences, including 
world-class universities, research centers, and scientists, as well as groundbreaking 
business leadership.5 These elements are not, of course, exclusive to the United States. 
However, there is one major factor that is exclusive: the government’s commitment to 
the free market system. This includes the conspicuous absence of artificial limitations 
(i.e., government regulations) on profits pharmaceutical companies reap.6 
The United States government and pharmaceutical industries have targeted other 
nations as part of the reason for the lack of American drug price controls. For example, 
former United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner, Dr. Mark 
McClellan, in his speech in the first-ever international colloquium on generic 
medicine, broadly stated that the United States shoulders most of the costs in 
developing new drugs worldwide.7 He further elaborated that “some of the world’s 
richest nations are driving the world’s hardest bargains” because they are only paying 
to produce drugs that the United States developed.8 He then suggested that richer 
countries need to shoulder related expenses to research and development of new drugs 
in proportion to their income.9 
Dr. McClellan implies that the United States’ domestic market is paying for the 
development of innovative new drugs. From this logic stems the belief that 
medications need freedom from governmental price controls so that the pharma 
industry can recoup their expenses associated with research and development. Foreign 
pharmaceutical companies seem to agree. While other countries are more frugal with 
pharmaceutical purchasing by utilizing a variety of price controls, discussed infra, 
foreign drug manufacturers take advantage of the lack of American price controls. The 
United States is veritably their profit haven, where they sell their products for higher 
prices to make up for price controls at home.10 Even though Americans consume 
roughly the same amounts of medications as citizens in other countries11 (and most 
 
3 US Price Gouging in the Pharmaceutical Industry, IHS MARKIT (2018), https://ihsmarkit.com/
solutions/us-price-gouging-pharmaceutical-industry.html [https://perma.cc/WY3D-HXTP]. 
4 Joseph Golec & John A. Vernon, Financial Effects of Pharmaceutical Price Regulation on R&D 
Spending by EU versus US Firms, 28(8) PHARMACOECONOMICS 615, 624–25 (2010). 
5 See generally DEVOL ET AL., supra note 1. 
6 See id. at 32, 34. 
7 See Janice Kopkins Tanne, FDA Chief Wants Other Rich Countries to Share Drug Development 
Costs, 327 BRITISH MED. J 830, 830 (2003). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 See Alaric Dearment, How Much Will Drug Price Controls Harm Innovation? It Depends, 
MEDCITY NEWS (Feb. 19, 2020), https://medcitynews.com/2020/02/how-much-will-drug-price-controls-
harm-innovation-it-depends/ [https://perma.cc/4JTS-3QT2]. 
11 See, e.g., Dana O. Sarnak, David Squires & Shawn Bishop, Paying for Prescription Drugs Around 
the World: Why Is the US an Outlier?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2017/oct/paying-prescription-drugs-around-
world-why-us-outlier [https://perma.cc/8L3L-X6PL]; Phill O’Neill & John Sussex, International 
Comparison of Medicines Usage: Quantitative Analysis from a Swedish Perspective, OFFICE OF HEALTH 
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certainly does not have the highest population), American consumers account for 
nearly half to seventy percent of all global pharmaceutical profits.12 
The United States spends more on health care than all other Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries.13 The United States 
spends nearly three times per capita what the United Kingdom (UK) does, and five 
times per capita what Canada does—and these countries have universal healthcare for 
all of their citizens.14 In a February 2019 health tracking poll, the Kaiser Family 
Foundation found that while most Americans (fifty-eight percent) believe prescription 
medicine has made their lives better, nearly eighty percent of Americans polled said 
the cost was “unreasonable.”15 About one in four people surveyed reported difficulty 
in paying for their medications, and thirty percent say that they have not taken their 
medications as prescribed due to cost.16 Only twenty-five percent of survey 
participants believe that pharmaceutical companies actually price their medications 
fairly.17 
Drug prices are not regulated in the United States. Any legal basis for taking action 
against excessive drug prices must be linked to a violation of established antitrust 
law.18 So although raising the price of a drug is not considered illegal conduct on its 
own, dramatic price increases have been a catalyst for increased government inquiry. 
For example, in 2016, there was public outrage over the sudden, 500% price increase 
of EpiPens, the injectable form of epinephrine.19 The drug’s manufacturer, Mylan, 
publicly confirmed that it received an information request from the Federal Trade 
 
ECONOMICS 15 (Apr. 2015), https://www.ohe.org/publications/international-comparison-medicines-usage-
quantitative-analysis-swedish-perspective# [https://perma.cc/V4XM-3D43]. 
12 Exact estimates depend on the sources cited. See, e.g., David Belk, Composite Analysis of the 
Finances for Thirteen of the World’s Largest Pharmaceutical Companies from 2011-2018, TRUE COST OF 
HEALTHCARE 3, https://truecostofhealthcare.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Totals-for-All.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/44GE-PW5T] (last accessed Aug. 29, 2020); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, REFORMING 
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AT HOME AND ABROAD (Feb. 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/CEA-Rx-White-Paper-Final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6AC-J4PZ]. 
13 It is estimated that the United States spent 16.9% of their GDP on health care in 2018. See Roosa 
Tikkanen & Melinda K. Abrams, U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective, 2019: Higher Spending, 
Worse Outcomes? THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-health-care-global-perspective-
2019 [https://perma.cc/K7TM-4B8V]. 
14 See David U. Himmelstein, Terry Campbell & Steffie Woolhandler, Health Care Administrative 
Costs in the United States and Canada, 2017, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 134–42 (2020), https://www.acp
journals.org/doi/10.7326/M19-2818 [https://perma.cc/3P22-68X6]. 
15 See Ashley Kirzinger, Lunna Lopes, Bryan Wu & Mollyann Brodie, KFF Health Tracking Poll - 











19 Epinephrine is used to treat emergency conditions, such as life-threatening allergic reactions like 
anaphylaxis (throat swelling compromising the airway and one’s ability to breathe). 
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Commission regarding possible antitrust violations.20 In October that year, Mylan 
agreed to pay a $465 million USD settlement with the United States Department of 
Justice to settle claims that the company overbilled Medicaid.21 As of the time of 
writing, Mylan continues to deny wrongdoing.22 
The pharmaceutical market is unique and complicated. The Mylan case helps 
illustrate a distinct feature that deviates from standard, textbook models of competitive 
markets: “Merit goods,” i.e., goods that should be available to all on the basis of some 
concept of need, rather than a basis of ability and willingness to pay.23 As with other 
merit goods, pharmaceutical pricing cannot be completely left to the market. This is 
the veritable recipe for a monopoly: companies are free to raise prices until profits 
decline. Medications weigh on public budgets, which is another reason why the 
government should intervene in the competition process. 
This Comment argues that the United States government should institute policy 
changes to enhance their ability to negotiate drug prices with manufacturers, limit drug 
companies’ ability to raise prices without confines or explanation, and make 
reimbursement contingent on drug performance to ensure that new medications 
actually provide measurable benefits. Arguably, this triple-pronged approach would 
not only make medications sold in the United States more affordable, it would also 
increase the quality of new formularies. 
This Comment is structured as follows. Section II is about determining the value of 
medicines. This includes an examination of the pharmaceutical industry’s research and 
development burdens, the industry’s economic market, and a discussion on what 
degrees of innovation new medications offer. Section III discusses the interplay 
between third party payors and the taxpayers in the United States. Section IV examines 
the international realm and how foreign countries balance pharmaceutical innovation 
and affordability. Section V reviews examples of U.S. legislation, both current and 
prospective-facing, as well as how some general competition law and policy 
framework for enforcement against excessive high prices. Section VI describes the 
potential downsides of curbing pharmaceutical prices at home, and Section VII 
discusses the government’s potential role in addressing high prices in pharmaceutical 
markets. 
II.  DETERMINING THE VALUE OF MEDICATIONS 
The prices of many drugs, both novel and old “gold standard” drugs, including 
generics, make affordable access difficult to both patients and payors in the United 
States. People’s willingness to pay for life-prolonging medications is high, which can 
lead to price-demand inelasticity.24 This is particularly true of medications that do not 
 
20 Dan Managan & Meg Tirrel, Mylan Faces Federal Antitrust Investigation in EpiPen Business, 




23 Merit Goods, TRIPLE A LEARNING: MICROECONOMICS SL, http://www.sanandres.esc.edu.ar/secon
dary/economics%20packs/microeconomics_sl/page_116.htm [https://perma.cc/U2FL-RP4R] (last accessed 
Aug. 30, 2020). 
24 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION ISSUES IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS 2 (2014) [hereinafter OECD 2014]. 
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have any viable alternatives.25 Consider Erbitux, a drug used to treat metastatic colon 
cancer. The “sticker price” of this medication is $13,329.60 USD for one month of 
treatment.26 It is incapable of curing patients; on average, it extends life just seven 
weeks.27 Avastin is another colon cancer drug that is not curative.28 On average, it 
extends life two to five months. Avastin’s sticker price in 2008 was $90,816 USD for 
eighteen weeks’ worth of treatment.29 Medicare covers both of these treatments.30 And 
although insurance companies and federal health insurance plans are liable for the 
payment of a large percentage of medications, they are limited in controlling 
consumption and selection.31 In contrast, the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE), the public body of the Department of Health in England, refuses 
to pay for Avastin due to its high cost and perceived low value.32 
The research and development process is inherently expensive and complicated. 
The resultant costs and the pricing structure of the pharmaceutical market are far from 
transparent, and there are valid concerns regarding the actual degree and value offered 
by costly new drug therapies.33 This section analyzes market factors in the 
pharmaceutical industry and what degree of innovation new medications offer. 
A. Costs of Research and Development 
The main form of competition between the largest pharmaceutical companies is the 
creation of new, patented, innovative therapies.34 However, pharma research and 
development is expensive and risky. There is an industry saying: “The first pill can 
cost more than a billion dollars while the second only costs a dime.”35 Drugs are 
expensive to create, and failures are common. In fact, successful development of a 
new drug from conception to market takes an average of ten to fifteen years.36 Even 
then, nearly ninety percent of all drugs entering clinical trials fail.37 Industry 
approximations of research and development costs vary widely, but the most 
 
25 Id. 
26 How Much Should I Expect to Pay for Erbitux?, LILLY, https://www.lillypricinginfo.com/erbitux 
[https://perma.cc/9YDE-93Q6] (last accessed Aug. 27, 2020). 
27 EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, HEALTHCARE, GUARANTEED 56 (2008). 
28 See Tito Fojo & Christine Grady, How Much is Life Worth: Cetuximab, Non-Cell Lung Cancer, 
and the $440 Billion Dollar Question, 101 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1044, 1044 (2009). 
29 See, e.g., EMANUEL, supra note 27, at 56; see also Fojo & Grady, supra note 28, at 1045. 
30 This price has started to come down, however (0.7%), in 2020 with the introduction of Pfizer’s 
biosimilar, Zirabev. See Stanton Mehr, Bevacizumab ASP Pricing Now Dropping with Biosimilar Entries, 
BIOSIMILARS REV. & REP. (Jan. 27, 2020), https://biosimilarsrr.com/2020/01/27/bevacizumab-asp-pricing-
now-dropping-with-biosimilar-entries/ [https://perma.cc/4X7N-EVKL]; Cf. EMANUEL, supra note 27, at 
56. 
31 OECD 2014, supra note 24, at 2. 
32 See Ananya Mandal, Avastin (Bevacizumab) Price, NEWS-MEDICAL.NET (Feb. 26, 2019), https://w
ww.news-medical.net/health/Avastin-(Bevacizumab)-Price.aspx [https://perma.cc/C7XA-W45R]. 
33 Id. 
34 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION AND 
REGULATION ISSUES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7 (2001) [hereinafter OECD 2001]. 
35 Preface, in MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE xviii (Norman R. 
Augustine, Guru Madhavan & Sharyl J. Nass, eds., 2018). 
36 CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS RATES, BIO INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 8 (2016). 
37 See id. at 10. 
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commonly accepted estimates, after full adjustment for trial failures, are between $200 
million USD and $2.9 billion USD.38 
As mentioned supra in this Comment’s opening salvo, it is these staggering upfront 
research and development costs that both the former FDA commissioner and the 
industry purports to be the major justification of unregulated drug price control. Like 
any other for-profit industry, pharmaceutical companies need to generate more income 
than they expend in order to remain in business. Drug developers depend on 
intellectual property (IP) protection to ensure that the “blockbuster” drugs (i.e., drugs 
that net a profit of over $1 billion USD) that make it to market provide returns on all 
research and development investments—not only for the innovator drug, but for all of 
the failures as well.39 Following this logic, research and development should be the 
number one expenditure of pharmaceutical companies, but in reality, it is not. In 2015, 
89 out of the top 100 pharmaceutical companies spent more on marketing than they 
did on research and development.40 There are billions of dollars left over for pharma 
companies once research costs are covered.41 
Additionally, pharmaceutical companies receive subsidies from American 
taxpayers to offset the costs of research and development,42 which helps insulate 
pharmaceutical companies from clinical failures. The National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), a division of Health and Human Services (HHS), provided the pharma industry 
with more than $100 billion between 2010 and 2016 for research. All 210 drugs 
approved by FDA in that timeframe received NIH sponsorship.43 Drug companies also 
utilize academic settings to conduct tax-deductible research and development.44 For 
instance, more than a third of all new drugs approved by FDA originate from a 
university.45 So in essence, American consumers pay for these drugs twice: during 
development, and later, consumption. 
To examine the return on investment (ROI) on these drugs, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) analyzed ninety-nine FDA-approved cancer medications 
developed between 1989–2017. Cancer medications were specifically chosen for the 
 
38 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PRICING OF CANCER MEDICINES AND ITS IMPACT 27 (2018) 
[hereinafter WHO 2018]. 
39 See generally OECD 2001, supra note 34; see also WHO 2018, supra note 38, at ix. 
40 The R&D Smokescreen, INST. FOR HEALTH AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY 3 (Oct. 20, 2016), http
s://nurses.3cdn.net/e74ab9a3e937fe5646_afm6bh0u9.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU8C-XX5A]. 
41 See Nancy L. Yu, Zachary Helms & Peter Back, R&D Costs for Pharmaceutical Companies Do 
Not Explain Elevated US Drug Prices, HEALTH AFFAIRS: BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.or
g/do/10.1377/hblog20170307.059036/full/ [https://perma.cc/K5Z9-LE5U]. 
42 See Mariana Mazzucato, How Taxpayers Prop Up Big Pharma, and How to Cap That, L.A. TIMES 
(Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1027-mazzucato-big-pharma-prices-201
51027-story.html [https://perma.cc/PBH6-D3NY]. 
43 See Ekaterina Galkina Cleary, Jennifer Beierlein, Navleen Surjit Khanuja, Laura M. McNamee & 
Fred D. Ledley, Contribution of NIH Funding to New Drug Approvals 2010–2016, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S. AM. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1715368115 [https://perma.cc/4Q2Y-A3N5]. 
44 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS 15–16 (Nov. 2017), https://www.g
ao.gov/assets/690/688472.pdf https://perma.cc/YLA8-ZV9F]. 
45 See Eric V. Patridge, Peter C. Gareiss, Michael S. Kinch & Denton W. Hoyer, An Analysis of 
Original Research Contributions Toward FDA-Approved Drugs, 20 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1182 (June 
22, 2015), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26113307/ [https://perma.cc/5C55-44AY]. 
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high research and development costs, as well as their steep prices.46 The analysis found 
that for every $1 USD spent (after full cost adjustments of trial and error, marketing, 
and production), the average return rate was $14.50 USD.47 Of the ninety-nine drugs 
analyzed, a solid third (thirty-three) ended up being blockbusters. 
Many of the medications analyzed in the study continued to generate massive 
profits for the drug manufacturers long after patents and market exclusivity rights 
expired.48 WHO concluded that the cost of research, development, and production 
bears little to no relationship regarding how the pharmaceutical manufacturers set 
prices, at least for oncology drugs.49 Pharmaceutical prices, they determined, are set 
according to the company’s commercial goals, with a special focus on extracting the 
maximum amount a buyer is willing to pay for medicine. It is this pricing approach 
that often makes cancer medication unaffordable, preventing the full benefit of the 
treatment modalities from being fully appreciated.50 
While the industry focus on cancer drugs sounds like a worthy endeavor (cancer is 
one of the top killers in the United States),51 it is not without criticism. Like the Avastin 
and Erbitux examples supra, many oncologic drugs are not curative; instead, they offer 
small, incremental gains (i.e., weeks of life versus a cure) for high prices.52 While there 
may be individual benefits to patients and their loved ones, research priorities may be 
skewed towards making these expensive, noncurative formularies versus treatments 
that are less profitable.53 To make a comparison, antibiotic resistance is an impending 
threat, now.54 While there are many kinds of infections, sepsis in particular is another 
leading killer in the United States.55 In fact, one in three people who die in American 
hospitals are septic.56 Yet, while antibiotics are fairly cheap to create in comparison to 
oncology drugs, one source purports only three pharmaceutical companies are 
conducting trials on antibiotics.57 Another reports that in 2018, there were only forty-
 
46 WHO 2018, supra note 38, at vii–ix. 
47 Id. at ix. 
48 Id. at 108. 
49 See id. at xii. 
50 See id. at ix. 
51 National Center for Health Statistics: Leading Causes of Death, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/leading-causes-of-death.htm [https://perma.
cc/BQE7-FGPN]. 
52 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices Doesn’t Add Up, THE 








57 See Joe Kennedy, The Link Between Drug Prices and Research on the Next Generation of Cures, 
INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://itif.org/publications/2019/09/09/link-between-
drug-prices-and-research-next-generation-cures [https://perma.cc/ZR6W-88TH]. Contra Antibiotics 
Currently in Global Clinical Development, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2014/antibiotics-currently-in-
clinical-development [https://perma.cc/3E5Z-2PK5]. 
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one antibiotics in clinical development to combat the threat of a superbug (a bacterial 
or viral infection resistant to all known antibiotics).58 Comparatively, there were over 
600 oncology drugs in development in 2018. Glibly, this juxtaposition “seems like 
profit maximization, not a case of sensible research priorities that reflects value in 
preventing and treating disease.”59 
B. How Innovative is Innovation? 
Innovations are protected through intellectual property (IP) rights (a protection 
deemed so important, it is in the U.S. Constitution). Patents serve both to recognize 
and reward drug companies for the commercial success of their products.60 Once a 
patent expires, the drug company loses the exclusivity for its patent, allowing generic 
drugs to enter the market. However, pharmaceutical companies can delay the 
expiration of their patents through a process colloquially known as “evergreening.” 
The process works like this: right before the expiration of a drug’s patent, the 
manufacturer can apply for an extension on the patent by making a slight change to 
the molecular structure, changing the drug delivery, or coming up with a new 
indication for the medication.61 The rationale for doing so is not for any therapeutic 
advantage, but an economic one.62 Evergreening thus stifles innovation by locking 
competitors in litigation by the patent holders as new, similar products are introduced. 
Consider Lantus, a patent-protected, long-acting insulin manufactured by Paris-
based Sanofi. Lantus is one of the “world’s best-selling drugs.”63 Sanofi made over $5 
billion USD off of Lantus alone in 2017.64 Lantus is the number one medication 
expenditure for Medicaid, and number two for Medicare.65 Total CMS expenditure on 
the drug increased 132% between 2012 and 2016.66 
 
58 Antibiotics Currently in Global Clinical Development, The Pew CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 15, 
2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2014/antibiotics-currently-
in-clinical-development [https://perma.cc/3E5Z-2PK5]. 
59 Emanuel, supra note 52. 
60 Innovation and Intellectual Property, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (2007), 
https://www.wipo.int/ip-outreach/en/ipday/2017/innovation_and_intellectual_property.html [https://perma
.cc/7UZ4-MMWX]. 
61 Roger Collier, Drug Patents: The Evergreening Problem, CMAJ (June 11, 2013), https://
www.cmaj.ca/content/early/2013/04/29/cmaj.109-4466?versioned=true [https://perma.cc/9QR3-3PRA]. 
62 Id. 
63 Andrew Dunn, Insulin Drugmakers Under Scrutiny for Pricing, Patent Practices, BIOPHARMA 





65 Drug Spending Information Product Fact Sheet, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (May 15, 
2018), https://www.cms.gov/index.php/es/node/52306 [https://perma.cc/224Q-8C2S]. 
66 Lantus: Overpatented, Overpriced Special Edition, I-MAK 2 (Aug. 2018), http://www.i-mak.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/10/I-MAK-Lantus-Report-2018-10-30F.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KC3-W7L] 
[hereinafter I-MAK]. 
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Generally, patents filed after 1995 obtain twenty years of patent protection.67 Sanofi 
initially filed their patent for Lantus in the United States in 1994, and the drug was 
first approved for sale in 2000.68 Researchers “found that 95% of the total patent 
applications (69 out of 74) on Lantus in the U.S. were filed after . . . 2000.”69 Since 
then, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USTPO) has continued to grant 
evergreening patents on Lantus through 2031—a full thirty-six years after initial 
approval.70 
Two drug companies with competing products have attempted to market and sell 
their own version of long-acting insulin, only to be sued by Sanofi.71 Lilly’s FDA 
approval of Basaglar (another long-acting insulin) was contingent on settling their 
legal battle with Sanofi.72 While Basaglar’s product launch was delayed an additional 
year due to litigation, the insulin was out in the U.S. market December 16, 201573 (it 
was already being sold in Europe).74 Basaglar remains Lantus’ only competition in the 
United States.75 
But how innovative are new drugs? There were forty-eight new drugs approved by 
FDA in 2019.76 Of the forty-eight, almost half (forty-four percent) were for rare 
diseases and were given orphan status (more on this infra), almost a quarter (eleven) 
were for cancer, and ten were biosimilars.77 Biosimilars are created to be similar to an 
existing FDA-approved reference product (any differences are not “clinically 
meaningful”), so they are not necessarily novel.78 Replication is a phenomenon 
following successful inventions, diluting the notion of “innovation.”79 The pharma 
 
67 Drug Patent Life: How Long Do Drug Patents Last?, DRUGPATENTWATCH, https://
www.drugpatentwatch.com/blog/how-long-do-drug-patents-last/ [https://perma.cc/CUH6-YDCH] (last 
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industry invests in (and has been criticized for) developing “follow-on” drugs.80 In the 
simplest of terms, these formularies largely duplicate the efficacy of existing 
medications.81 
The criticism of follow-on drugs stems from the knowledge that if drugs have more 
or less the same clinical outcomes as pre-existing drugs, what value do they offer?82 
These drugs absorb resources that could have been invested into research and 
development, which seems inherently wasteful if they are virtually indistinguishable 
from the pioneer drug.83 Additionally, these drugs require money to market. It seems 
counterintuitive to funnel additional resources that could have been utilized on 
research and development of novel formularies.84 Evidence also suggests that follow-
on drugs do not even significantly reduce the prices of the pioneering drug.85 
Some researchers point out that many follow-on drugs are the result of parallel 
development rather than imitation.86 For example, if Drug A and Drug B are 
concurrently in development, one of them has to reach the finish line first. The primary 
benefit of having two similar medications on the market is more options for patients.87 
Some patients may have a slightly better clinical outcome from Drug B even though 
Drug A is better for most patients.88 The second major benefit of follow-on drugs 
would be competitive pricing with pioneer drugs.89 However, in practice, there has not 
been any real discernable price differences between pioneer drugs before and after the 
introduction of follow-on drugs in the marketplace.90 For example, researchers Lu and 
Comaner demonstrated that for every additional competitor in the American pharma 
marketplace, the price of drugs only went down, on average, by two percent.91 
Paradoxically, Azoulay’s 2002 research identified examples in which the addition of 
follow-on drugs in the marketplace actually increased the prices of all of the 
competing medications.92 
III.  ECONOMIC STRESS ON PAYORS AND TAXPAYERS 
Third-party payor financing through health insurance or government funds strongly 
increases the ability of patients to pay. It should also be noted that most Americans 
have health insurance. The presence of health insurance insulates patients from the 
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true cost of their medications.93 As a result, many patients, as well as their providers, 
do not take into account the price of medications when making medical decisions.94 In 
turn, this can lead to higher prices. 
Strong buyers of care, such as national healthcare systems or large health insurance 
companies, should be able to negotiate prices with buyer power. A buyer’s bargaining 
power is usually determined by two factors: (1) The ability to walk away from the deal 
and (2) the volume of goods they are purchasing.95 For buyers to be able to negotiate 
on price, they need attractive alternatives other than the seller.96 In the healthcare 
setting, this alternative could be another medication or treatment. The reality is, in the 
American healthcare market, alternative options are frequently limited.97 
By law, Medicare covers medical treatments that are “reasonable and necessary,” 
but no real, formal definition of “reasonable and necessary” exists.98 In lieu of exact 
guidance, Medicare traditionally pays for medications approved by FDA.99 FDA 
approval is not hinged on how incrementally more effective new medications are on 
existing medications. Instead, their approval (and grant of marketing exclusivity) is 
determinative on whether or not a drug or device is “safe and effective,” which, in 
turn, is usually determined by a drug’s ability to better treat a condition than a placebo 
in the drug company’s own clinical trials.100 
Basically, for the purposes of FDA, “effectiveness” does not mean that a drug is 
“better” than another, or even that the “improvement” in one drug over another is 
worth the cost. Rather, it simply means that a particular drug is better than nothing. 
Because Medicare cannot negotiate with drug manufacturers (see the Medicare 
Modernization Act, infra), Medicare thus ends up paying for expensive medications 
without determining whether the added costs actually improve the quality or length of 
life.101 
Medicare expenditure continues to be a burden on the nation’s coffers. Dr. Ezekiel 
Emanuel put it succinctly: “The combination of continued payments for unproven tests 
and treatments, fraud, and uncorrected payment problems—along with the baby 
boom—threatens to bankrupt [the United States].”102 In 1966, its first year of 
operation, Medicare covered 19 million Americans at a cost of $3.3 billion USD—less 
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consumed a quarter of the 2019 federal budget ($1.1 trillion USD).104 Prescription 
drugs account for nearly $1 USD out of every $5 USD spent from the Medicare 
program.105 Overall prescription drug spending in the United States was half a trillion 
dollars in 2016 ($477,000,000 USD).106 
Take the example of cancer treatment, specifically early stage HER2 positive breast 
cancer (a type of breast cancer that represents twenty percent of all cases). A standard 
course of treatment is with a drug therapy combination of doxorubicin, 
cyclosphosphamide, docetaxel, and trastuzumab. Without insurance, the out-of-pocket 
cost in USD would be the equivalent of ten years’ worth of the average salary in India 
and South Africa, or nearly two years’ of the average wages in the United States.107 
And this estimation is only for the first line drug therapy: this does not include 
radiation or surgical treatment modalities, or supportive care like anti-emetics or blood 
products for transfusions. All combined, treatment for breast cancer would be 
unaffordable for most without health insurance. Even with insurance, patients report 
having financial stress to the extent that they may lower the treatment dose, only 
partially fill their prescriptions, or forego treatment altogether.108 
A. De Facto Monopoly 
Despite undeniable advances in pharmaceutical technology, there have been a 
number of competition enforcement cases regarding excessive pricing in the 
pharmaceutical industry recently. In 2017 alone, over forty-six state attorneys general 
brought claims against generic drug manufacturers alleging that they collectively 
agreed to raise prices.109 
Curiously, the conditions that brought these cases forward also seem to be relatively 
common in the pharmaceutical industry.110 According to a September 2018 report 
from the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), during 2016–2017 retail 
prices for 267 widely used brand name prescription medication increased another 8.4% 
after five straight years of double-digit average annual price increases.111 Additionally, 
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brand name drug prices increased four times faster than the general inflation rate in 
2017.112 
One argument cited against governmental influence on the pharmaceutical 
industry’s pricing is that the price itself operates as a device that allows marketplaces 
to “self-correct.”113 If a dominant company is earning excessive profits, for example, 
this will send a signal to attract new entrants into the industry.114 If a successful new 
competitor is likely to enter the market within a reasonable period, then, theoretically, 
it would not be reasonable for the government to intervene.115 
There are various factors that explain the level prices are set, including the degree 
of competition.116 In a standard market, if it is truly competitive, the price of goods 
will be set close to cost. With less competition in the marketplace, prices tend to be 
higher.117 One way to benchmark excessive pricing is a comparison of a similar 
product in the industry, known as the “competitive price.”118 But how does one define 
the competitive price in a market that is not competitive? Another benchmark is the 
cost of production.119 But what about companies such as drug manufacturers who 
create a number of different products? Taken together, these questions create 
difficulties that create risks when trying to enforce price control.120 If the government 
were to over-intervene, the pharma industry argues, then it would create a chilling 
effect on new market entrants, thus reducing competition.121 
MIT researchers Lu and Comaner studied competition in the pharma industry, 
specifically, follow-on drugs and their effects on competitive pricing.122 Follow-on 
drugs typically compete with the innovator drug because they treat the same 
condition.123 As discussed supra, Lu and Comaner concluded that each additional 
competitor reduces the price of the drug by two percent.124 However, the average 
number of competitors for each drug in their data was about three or four, “which 
seems to suggest that the effect of going from [a] pure monopoly to four 
(competitors) . . . with very similar products is a reduction in price of only 6%.”125 
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There are also cases that with increased competition, pharmaceutical prices actually 
went up. For example, the price of Tagamet, a stomach ulcer medication, actually 
increased when its first competitor, Zantac, entered the marketplace.126 The prices of 
both Tagament and Zantac also increased when additional competitors, Pepcid and 
Axid, were introduced.127 In essence, the only effect these drugs had on the market 
was market-splitting, as opposed to market expansion.128 From an economic 
perspective, follow-on drugs beg the question of excessive market entry. If 
competition is monopolistic, it can lead to too much or too little product diversity.129 
Usually, excessive market entry is not an issue for consumers. If the market is split 
several ways, consumers usually get the benefit of reduced pricing.130 But this 
phenomenon does not appear to replicate itself in the pharma market. Follow-on drugs, 
for example, bring product diversity. However, they do not bring forth price 
reductions. The result? The competitors in the pharma industry continue to have high 
economic rewards with comparably little social value or scientific innovation.131 Some 
researchers have even gone as far as to conclude that it is not the price of follow-ons 
and pioneering medications that are competing, but rather their marketing.132 
In situations of legal or de facto monopoly, economic theory predicts that a 
monopoly price will be imposed; i.e., the price which the monopolist earns the most 
profits.133 This approach was recently vindicated by the United States Supreme Court, 
which held that: “the mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant 
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of 
the free market system.”134 In the European Union (EU), on the other hand, Article 
102(a) of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits 
conduct by companies that “directly or indirectly impos[e] unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions.”135 Translated, this not only prohibits prices 
that are unreasonably low (“predatory pricing”) but also protects prices that are 
unreasonably high.136 In United Brands, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) explained 
that a price is abusive if “it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the 
product” and that abuse can be identified through an analysis that considers whether: 
(1) the price cost margin is excessive, and (2) the price imposed is either “unfair in 
itself or when compared to competing products.”137 This decision created a two-
pronged test, which is still employed by the ECJ in excessive pricing cases.138 
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Given the challenges identified supra, it is unsurprising that excessive pricing is an 
area of limited (or even nonexistent) enforcement in the American pharmaceutical 
industry. Excessive price regulation is both underdeveloped conceptually and 
underused in practice.139 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS 
Many countries believe that the price of medications should reflect their clinical and 
therapeutic value for patients and society. Other countries generally use more than one 
set of overlapping methods to establish prices of medications.140 International efforts 
to determine the entry price of drugs include free pricing, rate-of-return regulations, 
international reference pricing/external price referencing, cost-plus pricing, clinical 
and cost-effectiveness pricing.141 Some countries have also set maximum “ceiling” 
prices, while others have agreed to arrangements like discounts or rebates based on 
volume of sales or payment according to health outcomes.142 These arrangements are 
often agreed to on confidential terms between the manufacturer and purchaser.143 
Because IP rights are recognized on a territorial basis, each nation has established 
its own policy regarding imports.144 There are flexibilities built into the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) to overcome patient barriers.145 The TRIPS Agreement set out 
minimum standards for the protection of IP, including pharmaceuticals.146 Following 
the TRIPS Agreement, there was growing concern and evidence that patent rules might 
restrict access to affordable medications for people in developing countries 
(particularly for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria).147 This led to 
the Doha Declaration (2001), which stated “the [TRIPS] Agreement can and should 
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”148 The 
Declaration refers to a number of flexibilities, including the right to compulsory 
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licenses.149 It also extends the transition period during which the least-developed 
countries do not have to enforce or grant patents to pharmaceuticals.150 
Under TRIPS, new drugs may be subject to at least twenty years of patent protection 
in all member nations, apart from the flexibilities for the least-developed countries and 
a few non-WTO members, such as Somalia.151 Successful AIDS treatment programs, 
such as in Brazil or Thailand, were only possible because key pharmaceuticals were 
not patent protected and could be produced locally at a much lower cost than 
purchasing from the United States.152 For example, when the Brazilian Government 
began producing generic AIDS drugs in 2000, prices dropped.153 “The AIDS triple 
combination therapy, which costs $10,000 USD per patient a year in industrialized 
countries, can now be obtained from Indian generic drugs company, Cipla, for less 
than $200 USD per year.”154 
Developing countries manufacture their own generic drugs in an effort to make 
them more affordable for their citizens. However, they have reported being pressured 
by industrialized counties and the multinational pharmaceutical industry not to make 
the most of these provisions.155 Even though the Doha Declaration can legally set aside 
patents, poorer countries are reluctant to “provok(e) the anger of the United States.”156 
For example, when Brazil manufactured generic medications to treat AIDS, the United 
States filed a complaint to the WTO to drop the law, and then, to not use it. Brazil was 
successful in fighting back, but it is presumed that smaller countries would rather “give 
in” than fight.157 
A. Caps on Capsules: Prescription from Abroad 
Despite differences globally, basically all countries do more than the American 
government in curbing pharmaceutical prices.158 In countries with universal health 
care, their governments are motivated to help keep prescription drug costs contained 
(described here as “profit controls”). Thus, other nations have a lower threshold for 
accepting the pervasive drug pricing monopoly like in the United States. 
There are several methods foreign nations employ to balance cost-containment and 
access to prescription drugs that should be considered stateside. For example, other 
countries may utilize a combination of “centralized price negotiations, national 
formularies, and comparative and cost-effectiveness research for determining price 
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method known “external reference pricing” (ERP).160 Under ERP, foreign 
governments permit sellers to set the price of pharmaceuticals by how much they are 
selling the same product in comparable markets. This would require price 
transparency. Additionally, once there is an agreement, some nations, like Canada, for 
example, caps the price drug manufacturers can raise it, and it has to align with national 
inflation rates.161 Such a stipulation is not present in the American market. 
Another method utilized by other countries is not just assessing whether a new drug 
is effective, but whether it is (1) more effective than existing therapies, and (2) if it is 
cost-effective.162 For example, England’s NICE, mentioned supra for refusing to cover 
Avastin, uses a quality of life formula in considering whether to cover certain 
medications.163 NICE usually requires “that the cost per quality-adjusted life year 
(QALY) remain below 30,000 pounds ($39,000)” as a prerequisite for government 
coverage.164 If the drug does not meet criteria, they would negotiate with the company 
for discounts and rebates.165 Canada also pays for prescription drugs for its citizens 
and utilizes a similar method to the UK. The Canadian government has a quasi-judicial 
agency board, the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, that will refuse to pay for 
medications it thinks are too excessive.166 Drug manufacturers must either comply or 
be willing to lose the Canadian market.167 Comparatively, research indicates that 
Americans consume more expensive drugs than their counterparts in other developed 
nations without any evidence of better outcomes.168 
Another method is limiting patent protection. Introduced supra in the Lantus case 
study, patent protections and FDA marketing exclusivity in the United States, 
bolstered with practices like evergreening, contribute to excessive drug prices. Other 
countries are not as favorable to the practice. India, for example, prohibits 
evergreening.169 Sanofi was also able to take advantage of the USTPO, and filed 
seventy-four patents in the U.S. for Lantus, compared with forty-six in all of Europe 
and twenty-five in Japan.170 Additionally, “due in part to more friendly biosimilar 
regulatory requirements,” Europe and Japan have more competitors for Lantus, two 
and three, respectively, compared to the United States’ one.171 
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B. Does Cost-Containment Stifle Foreign Innovation? 
There is no straight-forward answer to whether cost-containment stifles foreign 
innovation. Because the United States has not had price controls on drug prices, it is 
impossible to observe the “natural experiment” of how much innovation would be 
stifled if both American and foreign drug manufacturers were unable to freely price 
their goods in the States to maximize their profits. Sanofi, for example, the French 
company that created Lantus, had a profit margin of 29.3% for its shareholders last 
year.172 Unsurprisingly, most of that profit was made in the United States.173 
It also should be noted that quantifying productivity with Europe versus the United 
States is more complicated than at first blush: a drug company’s home base does not 
necessarily correlate with where it is developed.174 For example, some foreign 
companies develop and manufacture their medications in the United States. Further 
complicating comparisons is the number of biosimilars approved in the United States 
each year, opening up, yet again, the “what is innovative” debate. 
Several international biopharmaceutical companies are highly innovative and 
profitable in spite of being based in home countries with universal health care and 
profit controls. Switzerland is the home base to Roche and Novartis. AstraZeneca and 
GlaxoSmithKline are from England. Ireland has Allergan, Mallinckrodt, and Endo. 
Canada has Bausch. Bayer and Fresenius are German. The Netherlands has Mylan, 
and Novo Nordisk is located in nearby Denmark. Teva Pharmaceutical is in Israel. 
And as mentioned already, Sanofi is French. 
These companies were singled out in this Comment because they were forty percent 
of the thirty-five pharmaceutical companies examined by Ledley et al. for JAMA. 
Researchers compared the profitability of the pharmaceutical industry with other 
industries with expensive, upfront research and development costs, like the technology 
(e.g., Google, Apple) and materials industries (e.g., 3M).175 Altogether, the thirty-five 
pharmaceutical companies had a combined revenue of $11.5 trillion USD and were 
almost twice as profitable as the average nonpharmaceutical industry (13.8% versus 
7.7%).176 One can infer that to be competitive in the highly technical and regulated 
market of pharmaceuticals, these foreign companies have to be innovative. 
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom was credited with being the most innovative 
European country in 2017 and has 2,066 biopharmaceutical companies. Germany had 
the highest amount of European drug patents that year (627) and has 1,201 
biopharmaceutical companies.177 There are other examples of countries “with low 
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domestic spending on drugs but lots of innovation.”178 Denmark and Israel, homes to 
Norvo Nordisk and Teva Pharmaceuticals, respectively, spend relatively little on their 
citizens’ health care per capita (“only Costa Rica and Mexico spend less”) but have 
“significant biopharma innovation.”179 Switzerland spends second to the United States 
on healthcare, but they cap out-of-pocket spending for their citizens (primary care, 
specialty care, and prescription drugs altogether are capped at the equivalent of $2,645 
USD per adult).180 They also boast 100% insurance coverage for their citizens. 
Nevertheless, Switzerland is highly innovative: two of the world’s largest and highly 
innovative drug companies, Novartis and Roche, are based there.181 In fact, six of the 
forty-eight new drugs approved in 2019 by FDA belonged to Novartis.182 The converse 
is also true: Canada, with all of its healthcare protections for its citizens, is towards the 
bottom of all innovator countries.183 
V.  U.S. REGULATIONS: PROTECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Medications are subject to dense regulatory framework. With safety and efficacy 
concerns, IP protection, as well as the limited ability of competition enforcement, the 
pharmaceutical industry is already highly regulated.184 Nevertheless, different 
pharmaceutical markets are subject to different levels of regulation. This section 
summarizes current regulations in the American pharmaceutical industry. 
A. Current Federal Regulations 
While there are currently no laws in the United States controlling pharmaceutical 
profits, the pharmaceutical industry argues that advances both in science and drug 
development have increased when Congress passed legislation that supports, 
promotes, and incentivizes innovation. “In reality, patent law and the exclusivities 
offered by FDA often act to inhibit innovation and confound public goals.”185 The 
government has also instilled measures to help the pharma industry with the assistance 
of federal funding.186 Finally, the Bush Administration effectively limited CMS’ 
ability to negotiate drug prices with the pharmaceutical companies.187 
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These policies include the Orphan Drug Act, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the 
Medicare Modernization Act, among others.188 It should be noted that this section is 
not meant to be inclusive of all current federal regulations (this would go beyond the 
scope and length of this Comment). Nevertheless, instead of regulating the 
pharmaceutical industry, U.S. lawmakers have instead opted to protect the 
pharmaceutical industry’s monopolization on innovation and prices through Congress. 
1. Orphan Drug Act 
The term “Orphan Drugs” refers to medications used in the treatment of rare 
diseases and conditions. The United States Orphan Drug Act (ODA) of 1983 is so-
named because it refers specifically to drugs that treat rare diseases and conditions.189 
It was amended in 1984 to define rare diseases as those affecting less than 200,000 
people in the United States. However, it also includes drugs for diseases affecting over 
200,000 people if creating and selling the drug was not commercially viable.190 
Development of a medication is not commercially viable unless potential profits dwarf 
the cost of research and development. These conditions are considered “commercial 
orphans” because the population number of those afflicted with these conditions are 
too small to render commercially feasible development.191 The Act was initially 
promulgated with good intentions. ODA helped the pharmaceutical industry by 
lowering barriers for orphan research and development, and protecting their markets 
with exclusivity.192 
The major benefit of ODA is that it has been largely credited for the substantial 
increase of the creation of drugs for rare diseases. For example, the number of orphan 
designations jumped from just one in 1983 (the year the law passed), to forty in 1984, 
to ninety-one in 2018.193 ODA helps protect these pioneering drugs from follow-on 
imitators.194 One of the most important features of ODA is a seven-year period of 
marketing exclusivity for classified drugs for rare diseases. In short, a follow-on drug 
without any clinical benefit over an older, pioneer drug with ODA exclusivity will not 
be approved for sale in the United States.195 ODA also aids drug developers by making 
annual grants available to either companies or academic-based researchers.196 Along 
with these grants, these institutions can also enjoy a fifty percent tax credit for the 
research and development process.197 
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Despite the noble purposes of ODA, the pharmaceutical industry has been 
exploiting this loophole. Critics insist drug manufacturers are manipulating the system 
and the ODA incentives need to be revisited.198 Absent competition during the initial 
seven years of a drug’s orphan classification, manufacturers not only have zero 
competition, but they can charge whatever price they want. Further, if the 
manufacturer can find another potentially curative effect for a different rare disease, 
the company can get another waiver on the same drug, in an endless Groundhog Day-
esque cycle. 
America’s Health Insurance Plan claims that the pharmaceutical industry has 
“gamed the system,” with manufacturers viewing ODA as a way to maximize profits 
by turning products that treat a small number of patients into multibillion-dollar 
sellers.199 In 2017, Kaiser Health News published an investigation into orphan drug 
development. Their analysis suggests that pharma manufacturers milk ODA by having 
drugs gain orphan status after they were already approved for another disease.200 
FDA officials have stated that before Kaiser’s study was published, they did not 
realize how many existing drugs have been repurposed by companies, exploiting the 
loophole.201 For example, a drug that can treat one cancer can be approved for multiple 
others. Novartis, the manufacturer for Gleevec, an effective cancer treatment for 
myeloid leukemia, has been awarded nine “orphan” approvals for other cancer 
treatments.202 In contrast, Novartis tried to make the same argument for Gleevec to 
justify extending their patent in India. India’s Supreme Court vehemently denied their 
request.203 
Another example: Humira is a medication to treat rheumatoid arthritis. It is also the 
world’s top-selling drug. Its 2016 revenues reached $7.6 billion USD in the third 
quarter in the United States and $11.8 billion worldwide. Now, it has achieved “orphan 
status” for juvenile arthritis, Crohn’s disease, and more—giving AbbVie, its 
manufacturer, market exclusivity until 2023.204 As these facts are laid open, it seems 
readily apparent that there needs to be policy reform. As it stands, FDA still insists on 
protecting the law. 
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2. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
The development of generic drugs was largely supported internationally by the 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act, also known as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, in the United States in 1984. The Act not only defined generic drugs, but it also 
approved the methods by which they should be approved and regulated, thereby 
creating the generic drug industry as we know it today in the United States.205 Generic 
drugs have been the focus in the quest for greater drug affordability, but not without 
the concerns that generic drugs could weaken the industry by simply producing a 
medication after the major research and development (along with all of the associated 
costs) has been finished by the brand name manufacturer.206 Competition between 
generic and brand name industries is desirable for patient pockets; however, policies 
must maintain a delicate balance to ensure that one market does not dominate and 
destroy the other.207 
The Hatch-Waxman Act was promulgated in response to Roche Products, Inc. v. 
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.208 Roche owned flurazepam and Bolar was planning on 
selling a copy of the drug after Roche’s patents expired.209 Bolar’s plan was to time 
their approval to conveniently coincide with the expiration of Roche’s patents. The 
essence of Roche’s case was that Bolar was planning on developing and marketing 
flurazepam while the drug was still protected under Roche’s patent.210 The issue was 
that by doing preparatory efforts while the drug was still protected, Bolar was 
effectively infringing on Roche’s patent.211 Roche sued Bolar for patent infringement 
and ultimately won.212 
From a public policy perspective, this case extended patent protection of the name 
brand drug manufacturers. If another manufacturer cannot begin working on a drug 
while the developer’s patent is in full force, that means that work on the generic drug 
can only begin once the patent expires.213 The approval process following patent 
expiration for generic purposes is around two to three years, thereby extending patent 
protection. Congress acted quickly after Roche was decided and passed the Hatch-
Waxman Act.214 
Broadly speaking, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides incentives for drug companies 
to challenge patents owned by innovators while simultaneously giving generics a 
research exemption that allows them to develop generic drugs while the branded 
patents are still in force—without the added liability of infringement.215 Another 
feature of the act was to encourage a race to market by granting the first generic 
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approval that challenges a patent listed in the “Orange Book” (a patent database of 
approved pharmaceuticals) with as much as 180 days of market exclusivity.216 The 
generic sponsor will be able to price the drug at a premium during their 180 days.217 
This was designed to allow the first filer to earn a substantial return for both their 
investment in science, as well as the legal work needed when challenging a patented 
medication.218 After the initial 180 days, typically other generic filers enter the 
market.219 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also contains provisions that are favorable to the drug 
innovators. The act gave innovators FDA regulatory inclusivity (usually about five 
years for a new product), a period during which FDA will not approve a generic.220 
For a number of big drugs, these periods of inclusivity have been worth billions of 
dollars.221 
3. The Bayh-Dole Act 
The Bayh-Dole Act is an unfortunate example of the United States already having 
the tools in its arsenal to combat pharmaceutical pricing, but never using them. 
Adopted by Congress in 1980, the bipartisan Bayh-Dole Act (the Patent and 
Trademark Law Amendments Act) allows institutions and grant recipients, such as 
universities, to hold the title to patents on inventions stemming from government-
funded research. They are then permitted to license the rights to these inventions to 
the private sector, who further develop them for commercialization.222 
Inventions conceived through federally funded research projects are required to be 
reported to the agency that funded the project, like NIH. The Act permits businesses 
(large and small) and nonprofits (including universities) to retain ownership of the 
inventions created with the assistance of federal funding. In turn, the organizations are 
expected to file for patent protection and to ensure commercialization upon licensing 
for the benefit of public health.223 
Before the Bayh-Dole Act, no drug had been created from federally funded 
inventions.224 Since the Bayh-Dole’s inception, federal funding for drug development 
has been the new standard. The NIH alone, for example, supported ninety-seven 
percent of FDA approved drugs between 2010 and 2016.225 As The Economist notes, 
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the Bayh-Dole Act “unlocked all the inventions and discoveries that had been made in 
laboratories throughout the United States with the help of taxpayers’ money.”226 
What happens to the medications once the private industry starts licensing the 
federally funded drugs? The companies price them however they want.227 Congress 
intended to guard against such monopolization in the Bayh-Dole Act with a provision 
known as “march-in rights.”228 These march-in rights were intended to act as a hard 
stop to abuse and ensure that federally funded inventions were being used for the 
benefit of the public.229 This was meant to include new medications being “available 
to the public on reasonable terms” or where public health or safety needs are not being 
satisfied.230 Because up to half of all new medicines in the United States are invented 
at universities through taxpayer funding, it seems rational that the public should reap 
the benefits of inventions they helped fund.231 
How many times has the United States exercised their march-in rights in nearly four 
decades? Exactly zero.232 As mentioned supra, American taxpayers are forced to pay 
for federally funded pharmaceutical inventions twice: once for the research that the 
federal government paid for with taxpayer funds, and again as patients for 
monopolized and arbitrarily priced medicines.233 
The fact that march-in rights have never been utilized by NIH/HHS means one of 
two things: either there have never been any abuses of publicly funded patents during 
this time period or that the government does not care enough to make medications 
affordable.234 The NIH/HHS has repeatedly denied requests for the exercise of march-
in rights because they do not believe that “reasonable terms” includes price 
considerations.235 This is not likely to change any time soon, as President Trump swore 
in Alex M. Azar II, a senior executive at Eli Lilly for ten years, as the 24th Secretary 
of Health and Human Services.236 
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4. The Medicare Modernization Act 
The United States Congress banned government negotiations on drug price 
regulation during the Bush Administration in 2003.237 The Medicare Modernization 
Act (MMA) of 2003 established the Medicare Part D benefit.238 The MMA included a 
provision, known as the “noninterference” clause, which stipulates that HHS Secretary 
“may not interfere with the negotiations between drug manufacturers and 
pharmacies . . . and may not require a particular formulary or institute a price structure 
for the reimbursement of covered Part D drugs.”239 The provision effectively 
prohibited the United States Government from having a direct role in negotiating or 
setting drug prices in Medicare Part D.240 
The Part D program allows the private insurers who provide prescription drug 
coverage to negotiate drug prices.241 The private payors were given the authority to 
negotiate for drug prices, establish formularies, and apply utilization management 
tools to control costs since Medicare is not allowed to do so. This approach contrasts 
with how drug prices are determined in other federal programs, such as the mandatory 
drug price rebates in Medicaid and the use of ceiling prices and minimum discounts 
employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs242 and the Department of Defense 
(they pay about half of retail value for medications).243 
Since the inception of the MMA, some lawmakers have continued to press for 
legislation that would give the Secretary of HHS authority to negotiate drug prices for 
Medicare beneficiaries.244 This policy concept has recently gained more attention in 
Congress because Democrats, who have historically been the strongest supporters of 
pharmaceutical price control regulation, now hold a majority in the United States 
House of Representatives. Ninety-two percent of Americans are in favor of letting the 
government negotiate drug prices for Medicare beneficiaries.245 This move would 
mirror centralized pricing methods utilized in Europe.246 As of this writing, the Trump 
Administration has not proposed any change in law nor taken a position on the 
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congressional proposals to allow the government to negotiate drug prices. However, 
President Donald Trump expressed support for the idea prior to taking office.247 
B. Proposed Federal Legislation 
Regulating pharmaceutical pricing is of concern to elected representatives. Instead 
of outright price controls, two senators introduced a bill in the summer of 2019 
targeting manufacturers who use public funds in the creation of NMEs. 
1. We PAID Act 
Two United States senators, Chris Van Hollen (D-Md) and Rick Scott (R-Fla), 
introduced bipartisan legislation to address the “skyrocketing” costs of drugs on July 
31, 2019.248 The We Protect American Investment in Drugs (We PAID) Act was 
created to ensure that prices of drugs developed using federal funds are set at 
“reasonable” levels.249 Because taxpayers pay for the funding, the two senators argue 
(and as explained further supra), they should also be able to afford these drugs.250 
If enacted, this act would allow the National Academy of Medicine to determine 
what is a reasonable price for a drug and to consider factors such as federal investment, 
affordability, research and development costs, the market for the drug, international 
and domestic sales, and public payer expenditures.251 The act would also establish an 
independent committee, the Drug Affordability and Access Committee, to determine 
the price based on the National Academy of Medicine’s study.252 The manufacturers 
would have to enter licensing agreements with the government to ensure price 
control.253 The two senators are hopeful that their bill will have momentum. 
C.  State Legislation 
Reducing the cost of prescription drugs is a small subset of issues that members of 
the House, Senate, and White House are interested in pursuing. Whether they can 
collectively agree on a policy solution is an entirely different matter. One tactic that 
some of the individual states are trying to induce is increased transparency. Because 
the United States is a multi-payor landscape, the actual prices of medications vary 
widely.254 Their undisclosed discounts remain confidential (see MMA, supra), and 
ultimately, the general public has very little insight into the actual prices. States like 
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California, Nevada, Maryland, and New York are all implementing legislation that 
seeks to provide transparency in prescription drug prices.255 
In October 2017, California signed into law SB 17.256 It requires drug manufacturers 
to notify purchasers at least sixty days before increasing the list price of a prescription 
drug by more than sixteen percent in a two-year period.257 All drugs with a Wholesale 
Acquisition Cost or that cost more than $40.00 USD for a thirty-day supply will be 
subjected to the new legislation.258 Meanwhile, health plans and insurers must self-
disclose information that will be compiled in a consumer-friendly report highlighting 
the overall effects of drug costs on healthcare premiums. Vermont also has a drug 
transparency law (S.216). This law requires drug manufacturers to justify price 
increases exceeding fifty percent over five years or fifteen percent in a single year—if 
they place a substantial burden on the state—to the Attorney General’s Office. They 
could face fines up to $10,000 USD if they fail to do so.259 
Maryland approved a new “price gouging” law (HB 631) targeted towards essential 
generic and off-patent products that would cap prices for certain medications.260 
Maryland’s law goes one step further than most transparency laws. Maryland’s 
provisions essentially cap annual price increases to below fifty percent. This strategy 
likely would have been considered far too controversial for approval in the United 
States a few years earlier. Thanks to the pharmaceutical pricing landscapes’ significant 
events during the past few years, public opinion of the industry has been markedly 
affected.261 
It may not be surprising that the generic drugs trade association, Association for 
Accessible Medications (AAM), filed a lawsuit challenging the law’s 
constitutionality.262 First, AAM alleged that HB 631 violates the Commerce Clause of 
the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause governs interstate commerce 
occurring between the states, thereby making it within the federal government’s 
domain. The AAM was found to have standing because the law regulates commerce 
inside and outside of Maryland.263 
AAM made their constitutional challenge based on several points. First, they argued 
that HB 631 specifically targeted transactions between pharmaceutical manufactures 
and wholesale distributors or retail pharmacy chains with centralized warehouses, 
none of which are in Maryland.264 Furthermore, AAM alleged that pricing 
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AAM stated that “next to none of the largest drug manufacturers . . . reside in 
Maryland.”266 AAM went on to argue that price restraints imposed by HB 631 would 
“inevitably affect commercial transactions, pricing, and commerce in other states.”267 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with AAM’s argument and found that 
HB631 directly regulates transactions that take place outside Maryland.268 The State 
of Maryland sought a writ of certiorari, concerned that this case sets “a precedent that 
would deprive a state of power to protect consumers from predatory commercial 
practices that originate out of state, even though they are directed into the state and 
will directly harm its citizens.”269 The writ was denied.270 
VI. CAPPED CAPSULES: POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS 
If the United States were to curb the profit motive for pharmaceutical manufacturers 
through the myriad of options already in place overseas (i.e., limiting evergreening to 
measurable formulary changes, negotiating prices, capping the amount a medication’s 
price can be raised in a given year, refusing to allow Medicare to reimburse expensive, 
low benefit medications, etc.), it would be naïve to think there would not be any 
consequences. For one, it’s estimated that global profits would decrease by $134 
billion USD.271 It is also worth mentioning that price increases do not change the 
quantities ordered or manufacturing price; increased prices are strictly attributed to 
profits.272 
Professor and economist Darren Filson describes a potential parade of horribles if 
the U.S. adopted European-like price controls. In a study partially funded by Pfizer, 
he asserts that drug corporations would fall in value by thirty-five percent, and the 
output of NMEs would decrease by forty percent to the detriment of consumer 
welfare.273 As profit motives are decreased, drug companies may focus their attentions 
more on the potentiality of a drug’s profit for rare diseases rather than its applicable 
use in more common, and less profitable, disease prevention and treatment274 
(however, there are salient arguments discussed supra that this is already the case). 
Currently, manufacturers at home and abroad make most of their profits in the 
United States. The brunt of this burden is felt by Americans more than in other wealthy 
countries because many Americans remained uninsured or underinsured. Even those 
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of French pharma company Genfit admitted “that the U.S. has been subsidizing 
innovation for the rest of the world.”275 Currently, other governments “get the best 
deal they can” from drug manufacturers because they can make up the difference from 
Americans.276 
Because the U.S. government (mostly) stays out of price negotiations (current drug 
price negotiations are mainly between private insurers and the manufacturers), it 
would be a stark contrast if the government took the front seat. Say, for example, that 
the government decided to use Medicare bargaining power (it could be in a variety of 
forms, like refusing to reimburse for certain drugs that are not cost-effective, negotiate 
prices for vital medications like Lantus, or cap out of pocket spending for recipients), 
the drug industry may be forced to make profits elsewhere. Their negotiations in other 
countries may look different if the drug companies could not rely on making the bulk 
of their profits in the United States anymore and may end up raising their prices 
abroad. 
Some researchers suggest that if prices in Europe increased, so would their 
innovation. With increased ability to make a profit, drug makers might be more 
incentivized to take the inherent risks involved in creating NMEs. Economists from 
the University of Southern California purport that if Europeans increased their drug 
prices just by twenty percent, it “would result in substantially more drug discovery 
worldwide,” causing societal benefits that would have a global impact.277 Europeans’ 
lives—as well as those globally—may also be better for additional formularies.278 
Researchers concluded for every $2.5 billion of revenue, one NME could be 
produced.279 
There is more to innovation than solely relying on profits. As mentioned supra, the 
United States has other methods in place to promote innovation aside from 
uncontrolled drug pricing, such as federally funded research, a strong patent system, 
and assistance from academia.280 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Americans pay more for their medications than anywhere else on the planet.281 Yet, 
despite its innovations and wealth, the United States has some of the worst healthcare 
outcomes of any other developed nation.282 Pharmaceutical prices were not regulated 
by the federal United States government in the hopes that the industry would self-
balance and self-correct as the market has for many other consumer goods. The 
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problem, as judge and Republican Party Vice Chairman, Alex Kim, eloquently put it, 
“In a free market, everyone just does what’s best for themselves.”283 Like modern-day 
conquistadors hoping to find gold in the new world, foreign drug manufacturers also 
reap the bulk of their profits in the United States. The pharma industry is not an 
altruistic one. It is a business. And because American taxes help fund the research for 
these drugs without ensuring universal access to them, the government should do more 
to regulate the industry to make pharmaceuticals more affordable. 
The first concern is the circumstantial evidence of HHS’ agency capture by the 
pharmaceutical industry. Almost a personification of this phenomenon is Secretary 
Azar. Prior to being a senior executive and CEO of Eli Lilly, he was an HHS 
attorney.284 However, during his subsequent tenure at Eli Lilly, the price of insulin 
nearly doubled while he was CEO.285 Now, as HHS Secretary, instead of regulating 
the industry at home, he has suggested that Americans should import their medications 
from Canada.286 Without even having to make further policy changes, HHS already 
has march-in rights that it has never utilized. The MMA should also be repealed. Most 
Americans (ninety-two percent) already support the idea that Medicare should 
negotiate drug prices, like the large, public payors in other countries do.287 
CMS should also institute a cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether or not to 
reimburse medications with little clinical value. This would also incentivize pharma 
to create drugs with greater efficacy, rather than focusing on the ones with the greatest 
price point. European-style profit controls should also be considered, including a 
mandate that the pharmaceutical companies reinvest a certain percentage of their 
profits back into research and development rather than utilize public funding. A great 
deal of pharmaceutical spending is on marketing, which should also be curbed. Drugs 
should not be advertised on television, directing consumers to ask their physicians 
about them.288 This completely undermines the role physicians have in their decision-
making and infringes upon the corporate practice of medicine. Further, still, is the 
connection between marketing and the prescribing rates of drugs. For example, 
between 2015 and 2017, pharmaceutical companies spent $39.7 million USD alone on 
opioid marketing. Researchers discovered the disturbing correlation between opioid 
marketing to physicians and patient deaths from overdoses.289 
Proposed state legislation is promising. Drug companies should explain their 
rationale for drug increases, like the fifteen percent increase in an annual year 
mandated in Vermont to enhance market transparency. Price increases should stay 
aligned with national inflation rates versus arbitrary increases with little or no warning. 
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While price regulation seems oppositional to the American free market system, it 
highlights another very American concept: choice. It’s the choice between taking 
insulin as prescribed, or rationing a drug as essential to life as oxygen. Following price 
gouging by the pharmaceutical industry, the choice was already made for many 
Americans. Only after an overhaul of existing policies can prices be comparable to 
what other developed countries pay for their prescriptions. Once these means are 
accomplished, Americans can more freely appreciate the pharmaceutical industry’s 
research and innovation as opposed to being victimized by it. 
 
